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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ASSESSING PATIENT PROTECTION LAWS

DAYNA BOWEN MATTHEW*

I. INTRODUCTION
Professors Hall and Sloan have written a paper that contributes
significantly to the literature on managed care regulation.1 First, their research
makes a significant empirical contribution, by compiling, coding and analyzing
the fifty states’ various patient protection laws to create a database for future
observation and study. Second, this research makes an important analytical
contribution by describing the extent to which managed care regulation
addresses specific defects in the market for managed care services. This
comment offers observations about the latter contribution.
By undertaking the task of examining the extent to which patient
protection laws address market failures, their article begins to examine whether
these regulations do any “good,” or, more precisely, whether there is any
objective justification for their enactment. Indeed, one would hope this
question was asked before the regulations were enacted. Nevertheless,
Professors Hall and Sloan provide a paradigm and data, allowing a
retrospective look that is instructive for future regulatory efforts. Hall and
Sloan conclude that few of the current patient protection laws address the most
important failures that characterize this market.2 Certainly, this observation is
both correct and useful as far as it goes. However, this comment suggests two
further inquiries.
In Part II, I challenge Professors Hall and Sloan’s underlying assumption
that if the market for managed care functioned properly—perfectly
competitively—then there would be no need for regulatory intervention to
achieve optimal resource allocation and distribution. This comment suggests
that the purpose of patient protection laws may not be simply to correct market
failure. Some patient protection regulation may be justified as serving other
*Gallion and Baker Professor of Law and Medicine, University of Kentucky College of Law; J.D.
1987, University of Virginia; B.A. 1981, Harvard-Radcliffe College. My sincere thanks to the
faculty and guests of the 2002 Health Law Symposium, sponsored by the Saint Louis University
School of Law, for the opportunity to participate in this program.
1. Mark A. Hall & Frank A. Sloan, Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation
of Managed Care, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2002, at 169.
2. Id. at 205-06.
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objectives. In Part III, I observe that the theory of relational contracts—as
managed care contracts must be correctly viewed—may provide a more
complete explanation of the patient protection laws than the market failure
approach alone.
II. PROFESSORS HALL AND SLOAN’S ANALYSIS SUMMARIZED
To appreciate Professors Hall and Sloan’s analysis, one must begin with
the assumption that if the market for managed care health services was
perfectly competitive, medical goods and services could be optimally allocated
through it, free of any government regulation. The perfectly competitive
market alone would achieve optimal levels of production, efficient pricing and
allocative efficiency of resources and inputs.3 It is clear, however, that the
market for managed care—like the market for health care generally—is far
from a perfectly competitive one. Professors Hall and Sloan identify five key
market failures that distort the market for managed care.4 First, consumers lack
information.5 Managed care goods and services are credence goods; neither
consumers nor regulators may easily determine reasonable or equilibrium
levels of quality, costs or pricing by any reliably objective method, either
before or after the goods are consumed. The information required to contract
for goods and services in this market is costly or unavailable; therefore,
meaningful comparisons between managed care products are difficult.
Moreover, managed care contracts restrict consumers’ choice so that the
market discipline that results when consumers “vote with their feet” is absent
from the managed care market. Second, the managed care insurance market is
imperfect due to adverse selection and cream skimming.6 Insurers are unable
both to predict the actuarial value of the losses they insure and to accurately
price the product they deliver. Thus, they seek to reduce the quality of the
product delivered, or to exclude sicker patients from their plans in order to
control costs. Hall and Sloan call this imperfect risk adjustment phenomenon
the “Achilles Heel” of managed care and managed competition. The third
identified market failure arises from the first two. “Churning” or high member
turnover reduces the long-term savings that managed care is designed to
achieve through improved preventative care and monitoring.7 The disparities
between employer and employee preferences in the managed care market
constitute the fourth market failure Professors Hall and Sloan identify.8

3. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941, 942 (1963).
4. Hall & Sloan, supra note 1, at 172-182.
5. Id. at 172-77.
6. Id. at 177-79.
7. Id. at 179-180.
8. Id. at 180-81.
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Finally, Hall and Sloan note that it is impossible to deliver the socially optimal
level of managed care goods and services because transaction costs associated
with determining the marginal benefit and marginal cost of each patient’s care
are prohibitive.9 The result has been the industry’s imperfect effort to
standardize patient care, which is the fifth market failure that Hall and Sloan
identify.10
Professors Hall and Sloan have tried to simplify and categorize the list of
market imperfections that might be addressed by patient protection regulation
by using the following catch-all terms: (1) Consumer Ignorance and
Asymmetric Information; (2) Imperfect Risk Adjustment; (3) Myopic
Orientation of Health Plans; (4) Lack of Consumer Choice; and (5)
Standardization of Care.
The next part of the Hall-Sloan analysis utilizes the invaluable database
these scholars have created, by coding and cataloging the managed care and
patient protection laws from each of the states.11 Their analysis applies what
Altman and Rosman have called the “elective model” of regulation.12 This
regulatory approach is “[t]he least interventionist point of view . . . . [in which
the] government only imposes regulations if required to correct market

9. Hall & Sloan, supra note 1, at 181-82.
10. Professors Hall and Sloan have identified five defects in the managed care market. All
but one have to do with decisions or characteristics of the parties to a managed care contract.
While their article does a good job of identifying those market failures that have to do with the
characteristics of the market participants themselves, two other categories of market failures are
not mentioned: structural market defects and defects due to the very nature of the goods and
services distributed in the market.
Structural defects arise simply because of the organizational infrastructure of the subject
market itself. In managed care, for instance, the sheer numbers of sellers or individual buyers
may prove to be a source of market failure. For example, in rural health markets, the shortage of
tertiary care hospital providers structurally impedes perfect competition for managed care
services in that sector.
A second category of market failure may arise from the nature of the goods and services
themselves that are produced and distributed through a given market. Here, the market failure in
the health care industry generally completely overlaps with the defects that hinder perfect
competition in the market for managed care services. For example, tertiary care hospitals, reliant
on costly medical technology and highly trained specialists, constitute a natural monopoly;
therefore, managed care plans are unable to offer the services of these providers in a perfectly
competitive environment simply because the product itself is unresponsive to the classic
competitive model.
11. These laws include “gag clauses”; “prudent layperson” standards of emergency coverage
statutes; tort liability laws; ombudsmen for appeals; independent and external review laws;
mandated benefits laws; point of service requirements; medical necessity definitions; limitations
on financial incentives available to plan doctors; procedural protections for physicians; and
restrictions on indemnification provisions insurers may obtain from physicians.
12. Stuart H. Altman & Brian Rosman, Introduction: The Philosophy of Regulation, in
REGULATING MANAGED CARE, at xxiv (Stuart H. Altman et al. eds., 1999).
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failures.”13 Adherents to this model often explain the need for suggested
regulations by demonstrating that markets fall short of achieving desired
equilibria without the regulation.14 However, the elective model philosophy
does not result in a monolithic approach to regulation. For example, Walter
Zelman distinguishes two groups of elective model theorists, explaining “the
goal of market-directed regulation then, is not to protect individuals in the face
of market failure but to reduce the probability of such failure in the first
place.”15
Hall and Sloan’s work is descriptive and, therefore, neither ex post nor a
priori. Nevertheless, their posture as elective model theorists is clear and their
preference for legislation that prevents market failure is strongly suggested.16
The analytical approach they take involves matching the list of patient
protection regulations they compiled, with the five identified categories of
managed care market failures. To the extent that the regulatory measure
matches or “fits” with an identifiable failure, that regulation serves a purpose.
Absent such a connection between regulation and market defect, Hall and
Sloan question the purpose and effectiveness of the subject law. Table 1
summarizes the correlations between patient protection laws and market
defects that Hall and Sloan have identified. Table 1 also combines the two
important strains of Hall and Sloan’s empirical research, to display the core of
their analytical contribution.

13. Id.
14. See, e.g., William Encinosa, The Economics of Regulatory Mandates on the HMO
Market, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 85 (2001) (socially optimal levels of quality care and access to
specialty care unavailable through markets absent regulation).
15. Walter Zelman, Regulating Managed Care: An Overview, in REGULATING MANAGED
CARE 13 (Stuart H. Altman et al. eds., 1999); See also Patricia A. Butler, The Current Status of
State and Federal Regulation, in REGULATING MANAGED CARE 33 (Stuart H. Altman et al. eds.,
1999) (describing the regulatory tools state and government may use to “enhance the functioning
of a market in health care”).
16. See Hall & Sloan, supra note 1, at 197 (“However, these ex post protections are in
tension with increased choice at the point of insurance purchase, which is the market’s primary
engine.”).
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TABLE 1
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MANAGED CARE REGULATIONS AND
MARKET FAILURES
Patient Protection
Law17

Market Defect
Addressed

Authors’ Comments

Liability and Appeal
Liability (14)

Information
Asymmetry,
Standardization,18
Plan/Patient Agency
Disparities, Lack of
Consumer Choice19

“[R]espond[s] directly
to market failure
resulting from patients=
inability to judge
quality.”20

Anti-Indemnity (26)

Information
Asymmetry,
Physician/Patient
Agency Disparities21

Responds directly to
market failure resulting
from patients’ inability
to judge quality and
potential compromises
in physicians’
professional
independence.22

17. The number of states having adopted this provision as of 2001 is noted in parenthesis.
18. Hall and Sloan theorize that liability laws “respond directly to the market failure that
results from patients’ inability to judge quality. . . . In theory, tort liability will encourage plans
to provide care and honor their promises up to the level where the marginal cost of extra care
equals the marginal benefit of harm avoided.” Id. at 191.
19. Explaining why the Coase Theorem does not operate in the managed care contract, the
authors note that “employers negotiate the primary insurance contract and they may not fully or
accurately reflect employees’ preferences. . . .” Id. at 193.
20. Id. at 191.
21. The agency disparity between managed care plans’ interests and the interests of the
patients who rely upon their decisions represents a market failure rationale that Hall and Sloan
argue explains liability provisions addressing negligent coverage decisions. See id. at 191-92.
However, the agency disparity relevant to liability provisions addressing the quality of medical
care is between the physician and the patient. This second disparity is an example of a market
failure important to the Hall-Sloan analysis, but not included in the original list of five market
failures relevant to their initial analysis.
22. Hall & Sloan, supra note 1, at 191-92.
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External Review (42)

Information
Asymmetry,
Standardization,
Plan/Patient Agency
Disparities, Lack of
Consumer Choice,23
Myopia

Addresses the same
issues and shares same
justifications as liability
provisions.24

Funding Ombudsman
(18)

Information
Asymmetry,
Standardization,
Plan/Patient Agency
Disparities, Lack of
Consumer Choice,
Myopia

Addresses the same
issues and shares same
justifications as liability
provisions.

Provider Access Laws
Any Willing Provider
(26)

Imperfect Risk
Adjustment, Myopia25

Reasonably good fit
with significant market
failure.

23. The authors conclude that “external review laws address the same issues and share in the
same justifications [as liability laws].” Id. at 193. The authors further add turnover and patient
heterogeneity as justifications for external review laws. “Additional, external review addresses
the problem of incomplete or ‘relational’ contracting that arises from the inability to specify in
concrete detail exactly what medical services are covered by insurance.” Id.
24. Id. at 192.
25. Professors Hall and Sloan seem to use “myopia” earlier in the paper to describe managed
care plans’ shortsighted decisions to drop sick patients from their contracts, but later use the term
to describe patients’ failure to know or plan ahead for uncertainty of the illnesses that require
coverage. Compare Hall & Sloan, supra note 1, at 194, with id. at 195. Therefore, it would seem
important to add “Information Asymmetry” to the list of market failures justifying these
regulations, based on the authors’ explanation:
Access provisions that are more narrowly tailored to chronic or especially severe
conditions address two different concerns: insurers’ incentive to provide poor service to
those with chronic illness, and healthy consumers’ difficulty ex ante in knowing their own
likely preferences where they to become ill in the future—in short the problems of risk
adjustment and myopia (or salience).
Id. at 194 (emphasis added). This same observation applies to the authors’ discussion of Freedom
of Choice and Continuity of Care provisions as well.
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Freedom of Choice (35)

Imperfect Risk
Adjustment, Myopia

Reasonably good fit
with significant market
failure.

Access to OB/GYN
without gatekeeper
approval. (42)

Lack of Consumer
Choice

Broad access provision
with weak relationship
to market failure.

Specialists (34)

Lack of Consumer
Choice

Continuity of Care (36)

Imperfect Risk
Adjustment, Myopia

Reasonably good fit
with significant market
failure.

Point of Service (23)

Lack of Consumer
Choice

Broad access provision
with weak relationship
to market failure.
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Coverage and
Mandates
Medical Necessity (31)

Strongest justification is
to facilitate external
review, but should be
default provision only.

Weak market
justification for
specifying uniform
definition.

ER Prudent Layperson
(47)

Consumer Myopia,
Public Goods

Relates reasonably well
to these failures.26

Drive-Through Delivery
(41)

Collective action or
adverse selection
concerns27

Empirical inquiry
required to determine
strength of link to
market failures.

26. Although the authors say the “prudent layperson” standard addresses market failures
“reasonably well,” elsewhere in the article they describe these provisions as “among the least
significant of the different forms of patient protection.” Id. at 195.
27. Although these were not market failures listed in the first half of the Hall and Sloan
article, they are mentioned along with other classic justifications for regulatory intervention into
markets. See id.
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(20)

Collective action or
adverse selection
concerns28
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Empirical inquiry
required to determine
strength of link to
market failures.

Preserving MD
Independence
Physician Incentives
(29)

Information
Asymmetry,
Patient/Provider Agency
Imperfection29

Gag Clauses (50)

Physician Due Process
(32)

Least significant of
patient protection laws.
Symbolic, not
substantive.
Information
Asymmetry,
Patient/Provider Agency
Imperfection

Address concern that
MCO’s may
compromise physician
advice to patients.

Hall and Sloan conclude their analysis with an “overall assessment”
finding that the liability, external review and access to specialist provisions
address market failures directly, while the other provisions “respond only
weakly to legitimate market flaws.”30 Their analysis includes the caution that
some provisions may exacerbate or even initiate other market defects if
improperly applied, and the observation that regulatory enforcement measures
give effect to the laws states have enacted.

28. Hall & Sloan, supra note 1, at 195.
29. Hall and Sloan discuss an agency imperfection in the beginning of their article, which
describes the dichotomy of interests between employer/purchasers of group health insurers, and
the employee/patients they represent. However, they cite a different agency distortion here as a
market failure: the distortion between the patient and the provider whose interests might diverge
if physicians’ judgment is tainted by incentives MCO’s offer to act contrary to a patient’s best
interest. Id. at 192.
30. Id. at 197.
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III. RELATIONAL CONTRACTING THEORY—AN ALTERNATIVE JUSTIFICATION
FOR PATIENT PROTECTION LAWS
By choosing the elective analytical model, Hall and Sloan excluded
alternative approaches to explain the usefulness of the patient protection laws.
The directive model, for example, in which the government creates incentives
for market participants to compete directly, may describe the motivation states
have for requiring certain disclosures by managed care providers to facilitate
consumer comparisons. Similarly, the restrictive and prescriptive models
whereby the government substitutes its own preferences for those of market
participants, might explain the states’ decisions to mandate minimum
maternity stays. However, these models may explain the motivations for
legislators enacting their provisions. They do not, however, test the efficacy of
the statutes that have been enacted. In this sense, Hall and Sloan are looking to
do more than these alternative models can deliver. The relational theory of
contract, however, is an analytical model that may work to better explain the
states’ patient protection laws.
Managed care agreements are a paradigmatic example of that unique set of
contracts called relational contracts—contracts between parties who, at the
time of contracting, cannot know or anticipate fully the eventualities that will
trigger their respective obligations under the agreement. Therefore, on a
“going forward” basis, throughout the term of the contract, in order to jointly
maximize the expected value of a managed care contract, both the
provider/payor and the patient/participant must cooperate to minimize costs
and maximize services under the agreement. To the extent that the patient
wishes to receive high quality medical care, paid for under the contract on a
renewable basis, the participant must limit demands for the services the
contract offers such that the overall cost of performance by the MCO does not
exceed the aggregate premiums paid by plan participants. Similarly, for the
MCO to continue to receive premiums, it must stand ready to deliver the
expected quality of health care goods and services called for as plan
participants demand medical services under the contract, otherwise the plan
will be unable to attract these patients year after year. In a real sense, then,
each party’s return under a managed care contract depends on the other party’s
cooperative effort.31 Furthermore, the cooperation the parties seek must occur
in a costly environment where information and transaction costs are low,
monitoring is ineffective and conflicts of interest are inherent in the
relationship. Viewed in this context, managed care contracts are relational and
the patient protection legislation regulating them governs these relationships by

31. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901,
918-19 (1986).
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a series of default rules that provide objective certainty in an uncertain
contracting environment.32
The Liability and Appeal rules states have enacted function as generalized
rules that reduce the risk of strategic behavior while at the same time inducing
parties to share information that will allow them to jointly optimize the
benefits of their bargain. Coverage mandates and provider access laws provide
customized provisions that define what the parties might reasonably have
bargained for in advance, if we assume they are rational actors who had full
information at the time they entered the contract. Physician independence
rules are more difficult to explain because they insure for the benefit of third
parties outside the managed care bargain. However, relational theory
adequately explains these rules as limitations on strategic behavior and
protections to ensure the parties receive the benefit of their bargain.
It is far outside the scope of this Comment to comprehensively explore the
relational contract literature’s application to the managed care industry.
However, my intention here is to encourage a closer look at this literature’s
ability to explain these laws, and the way they do and should work, to expand
the very significant work that Professors Hall and Sloan have already done.

32. See generally Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules For Commercial
Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).

